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„The truth about apartheid – about its causes and effects…about who was 
responsible for its maintenance – continues to emerge. This litigation is one 
element of that emergence.‟ 
 
It is rare for the Opinions of US District Judges to begin with quotations from African 
clergymen, however distinguished. In choosing to head her Opinion of 8 April 2009 
with this statement from the amicus brief of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Judge Shira 
Scheindlin suggested that the apartheid litigation currently before the US courts had a 
significance extending beyond the financial compensation of the South African 
plaintiffs in the lawsuits; in other words, that these private law actions initiated in the 
United States against multinational corporations had a wider public importance.
1
 They 
could contribute, she suggested, to a better historical understanding of apartheid. 
On this analysis, the South African apartheid litigation has an importance not 
only for those directly involved in the lawsuits, but also for all South Africans and, 
beyond them, for an international audience. Tom Lambert suggested nearly 50 years 
ago that US tort law was „the jurisprudence of hope‟.2 Can it now become an effective 
„jurisprudence of truth‟ for the benefit of the victims/survivors of foreign repressive 
regimes and others interested in the clarification of responsibility for past wrongs? To 
what extent are US courts capable of effectively fulfilling this role? Should US courts 
even attempt to perform this task, or is it an unwarranted interference in the sovereign 
affairs of fledgling democracies attempting to deal with difficult legacies of conflict 
and human rights abuses?  
 
The Alien Tort Claims Act, Multinational Corporations, and Transitional Justice 
The apartheid litigation is at the eye of the continuing storm in the US over the impact 
of tort law on big business. Complaints from the corporate sector and conservative 
efforts to „unmake‟ progressive US tort law have rendered the Alien Tort Claims Act 
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of 1789 (under which the apartheid litigation has been brought) particularly 
vulnerable.
3
 The Alien Tort Claims Act („ATCA‟) grants US federal courts 
jurisdiction „of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States‟.4 ATCA lay effectively dormant for 
many years until the 1980s, when it began to be used principally by foreign citizens to 
bring claims in the US courts against other foreigners in respect of wrongs done 
outside the USA.
5
 In the last fifteen years, ATCA has increasingly been used in 
connection with claims against multinational corporations for human rights abuses 
committed overseas.
 6
 Despite the fact that no final judgment has ever been entered 
against a corporation in an ATCA case, the small number of cases brought to date has 
prompted a concerted campaign by corporate America to limit or repeal the 
legislation.
7
  
Judicial recognition of the increasing political and commercial sensitivity of 
ATCA cases was demonstrated in 2004, when the Supreme Court in the Sosa case – a 
case which, however, did not involve corporate defendants - urged the lower judiciary 
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to adopt a more restrictive approach to the interpretation of ATCA.
8
 In that case, the 
Supreme Court did not completely close the door on ATCA lawsuits; instead, it left 
the door „ajar, subject to vigilant gatekeeping‟.9   
Some human rights lawyers have cogently argued that a degree of judicial 
restraint is in fact desirable in ATCA cases, helping to „preserve and legitimate the 
statute to do its vital work‟ of ensuring that corporations are not completely 
immunised from serious allegations by systemic failure and the politically-inspired 
interventions of governments.
10
 In general, however, the Sosa case was a 
disappointment to human rights activists, conscious that the human rights documents 
of the last half century embody unrealised ideals for people in many parts of the world 
and that the ATCA was emerging as perhaps „the only effective means available 
anywhere of holding corporations legally accountable for international human rights 
violations.‟11  
The Opinion of the late Judge Sprizzo of the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York in the apartheid litigation, discussed further below, was 
delivered shortly after the Supreme Court‟s judgment in the Sosa case.  In what he 
saw as an exercise in „vigilant gatekeeping‟, Judge Sprizzo dismissed the South 
African plaintiffs‟ claims in their entirety. Following an appeals process in which the 
majority of the Court of Appeals took a different view from Judge Sprizzo and the 
Supreme Court found itself – extraordinarily – unable to muster a quorum, the case 
came before the District Court again in 2009, on a second motion to dismiss by the 
corporate defendants. Heard this time by Judge Scheindlin, the plaintiffs‟ claims 
survived, though in a severely limited form.  
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 The post-apartheid context of the litigation and Judge Scheindlin‟s emphasis 
on the issue of historical truth makes the apartheid litigation particularly interesting 
among ATCA cases to the transitional justice movement. To date, the focus of this 
movement, which has promoted greater accountability for human rights violations 
committed under ousted repressive regimes, has been largely on the criminal 
responsibility of individuals – generally, political leaders and members of state 
security forces. Increasingly, the responsibility of members of non-state armed groups 
for abuses has also received attention. Yet the responsibility of other non-state actors, 
such as corporations, has so far slipped under the radar of the transitional justice 
movement. At Nuremberg – the „locus classicus‟ of the transitional justice movement 
- some prominent individuals from corporations closely allied to the Nazi regime were 
prosecuted, but the corporations themselves escaped liability.  
In some ATCA cases against corporate defendants, such as Unocal and 
Talisman, corporations have been accused of collaborating with a repressive regime, 
but one that remains in power – in those cases, the Burmese military government and 
the Sudanese government of Al-Bashir respectively.
12
 The Wiwa case, alleging 
complicity by Shell with some of the excesses of the military regime of Sani Obacha 
in Nigeria, was instituted in the US in 1996, some two years before the death of 
Abacha and the subsequent election of President Obasanjo.
13
 The potentially 
complicating circumstances of political transition thus did not arise in Unocal and 
Talisman, and did not initially arise in Wiwa.  There was no suggestion in these cases 
that the plaintiffs should have brought their cases in Burma, Sudan or Nigeria.
14
 
The apartheid litigation, in contrast, was commenced some eight years after 
the first democratic elections held in South Africa in April 1994. It is a remarkable 
historical milestone, representing a first serious attempt to address under ATCA the 
civil responsibility of global corporations for their actions under an ousted repressive 
regime in Africa. 
One of a number of possible obstacles to the realisation of a „jurisprudence of 
truth‟ by the US courts is the attitude of fledgling democracies to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by US courts over matters they may prefer either to suppress or to deal 
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with in a different manner, e.g. through a programme of reparations, a truth and 
reconciliation commission and/or proceedings in domestic courts. The apartheid 
litigation is taking place in the context of a political transition which included a 
commitment on the part of the new South African government to establishing a moral 
and legal framework for dealing with past human rights abuses. Despite the plaintiffs‟ 
status as victims of apartheid, the hearing of their claims against multinational 
corporations in the US was adamantly opposed by the ANC government under 
President Thabo Mbeki. The extent to which the US courts should defer to the wishes 
of democratically-elected governments in transitional or post-conflict societies was 
thus squarely raised in the proceedings. Before any Opinion had been handed down in 
the apartheid litigation, the Supreme Court in the Sosa case had commented on the 
issue: 
„There are now pending in Federal District Court several class actions seeking 
damages from various corporations alleged to have participated in, or abetted, 
the regime of apartheid that formerly controlled South Africa. The 
Government of South Africa has said that these cases interfere with the policy 
embodied by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which “deliberately 
avoided a „victor‟s justice‟ approach to the crimes of apartheid and chose 
instead one based on confession and absolution, informed by the principles of 
reconciliation, reconstruction, reparation and goodwill.” The United States has 
agreed. In such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should 
give serious weight to the Executive Branch‟s view of the case‟s impact on 
foreign policy.‟15  
In the course of the apartheid litigation to date, US courts have displayed strikingly 
different attitudes to the proper role of US courts in calling multinational corporations 
to account for their part in South Africa‟s abusive past. These will be examined in the 
next section.  
 
The Apartheid Litigation 
 
The apartheid litigation began in 2002 as a number of separate actions brought by 
three groups of South African plaintiffs in eight US federal district courts. All the 
plaintiffs claimed to have suffered damage of varying kinds during the apartheid era 
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in South Africa. The actions were brought against some of the world‟s leading 
companies, which had operated in apartheid South Africa and which allegedly bore 
„some measure of responsibility for the crimes that pervaded that dark era of South 
African history‟.16 
In the aftermath of apartheid, the democratically-elected government of South 
Africa embarked on an extensive programme of reform, reconstruction and redress.
17
 
This included the drafting of a new constitution with an extensive bill of rights 
(including economic and social rights); a land reform and restitution scheme; black 
economic empowerment measures; the progressive reform of institutions, including 
the apartheid judiciary, prosecution service and police; and the creation of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission („the TRC‟), headed by Desmond 
Tutu, with power to investigate and report on a limited category of apartheid human 
rights violations, recommend reparations for victims and grant amnesty on certain 
conditions to perpetrators.  Despite the sometimes uncomfortable compromises agreed 
in the context of the negotiated ending of apartheid and the many cogent critiques that 
have since been made of the government‟s programme, these efforts unquestionably 
represented a serious attempt to deal with the apartheid past, unparalleled in other 
post-conflict societies in Africa.
18
  
Nevertheless, by the time the apartheid litigation was initiated in the US in 
2002, the extent of the „unfinished business‟ arising from the apartheid past had 
become clear, and the frustrations of those whose needs had not been addressed had 
bubbled to the surface. A particularly sore point for those victims of apartheid who 
had participated in the TRC between 1996 and 1998 was that the South African 
government had still not approved the recommendations of the TRC on reparations 
for the approximately 22,000 people it had officially recognised as victims. All 
attempts to induce the government to publish a policy on reparations had been 
deflected. The „mood music‟ emanating from the government was that it might not 
approve the TRC‟s proposals, which it said were too expensive, and some government 
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ministers had begun to characterise the legitimate demand for reparation (a 
constitutionally-mandated requirement) as mercenary.
19
  
For the victims, the reluctance of the government to respond to their needs was 
dismaying and the insinuation that they were attempting to „cash in‟ on their suffering 
insulting. Most were poor. Some had lost a breadwinner in the struggle against 
apartheid. Others were grandparents attempting not only to overcome grief but also to 
bring up the children of a deceased family member. Others were sick, mentally ill or 
disabled as a result of torture or bomb blasts and needed medical help for which they 
could not afford to pay. Archbishop Tutu and other anti-apartheid activists spoke out 
in favour of the victims, and some anti-apartheid lawyers attempted to assist them in 
legal proceedings to oblige the government at least to publish a reparations policy. 
Noting that the struggle against apartheid had been a struggle for justice, the Chair of 
the South African Human Rights Commission and former anti-apartheid activist, Jody 
Kollapen, rejected the government‟s claim that the reparations package recommended 
by the TRC was too expensive, arguing that the reparations issue was more one of 
lack of political commitment than lack of resources.
20
 Some speculated that the ANC 
had been so aggrieved by the adverse findings made against the party in the TRC‟s 
Report that it had simply visited its ire on the Commission by ignoring its 
recommendations for reparations and effectively discrediting its legacy.
21
  
The precise genesis of the US anti-apartheid litigation is not known with 
certainty; but the idea of bringing legal proceedings in the US against corporations for 
their role in apartheid was first publicly raised to the knowledge of the author in this 
tense and difficult context, at a meeting of members of the Khulumani Support Group 
(a victims support group formed in 1995, inter alia to assist survivors to engage with 
the TRC) and human rights activists and lawyers, held in Johannesburg.
22
 The novel 
suggestion was received with interest by the meeting, though the focus of efforts 
continued to centre on persuading the South African government to fulfil its 
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obligations to victims.  Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, the idea of suing 
corporations, both local and global, held some appeal, which was not simply a matter 
of finding defendants with deep pockets. For a start, the activities of the corporate 
sector under apartheid were widely regarded as having been inadequately dealt with 
by the TRC and thus constituted an area of „unfinished business‟.23 Moreover, some 
critics of the government‟s economic policy – particularly those to the left of the 
political spectrum - considered the ANC itself to have been „too soft‟ on the corporate 
sector; and the „fat cats‟ of the new black elite were regularly being accused by the 
media of „getting into bed‟ with big business for personal gain.  
The wide-ranging appeal of pursuing corporations for their actions under 
apartheid is evidenced by the committee of distinguished South African lawyers, 
historians, economists and others which advised and assisted the US lawyers with the 
initiation of the apartheid litigation. The connection to the inadequacies of the TRC 
was emphasised by the close involvement of Dumisa Ntsebeza, a South African 
lawyer and former Head of the Investigations Unit at the TRC; his brother, Lungisile, 
became the lead plaintiff in the first proceedings. 
The first group to launch proceedings were the so-called Ntsebeza plaintiffs, 
who had engaged the US lawyer, Ed Fagan, well-known for his success in persuading 
a number of Swiss banks to settle Holocaust claims out of court. The Ntsebeza 
plaintiffs filed a number of actions in seven district courts between 19 June and 6 
December 2002. The actions were filed on behalf of the class of individuals who lived 
in South Africa between 1948 and the present and who suffered damage as a result of 
the crimes of apartheid. The corporate defendants in the actions included banks (such 
as Citigroup, Inc. and Credit Suisse), arms manufacturers (such as Oerlikon 
Contraves, AG, now a subsidiary of German arms manufacturer, Rheinmetall), 
automotive companies (such as American Isuzu Motors, Inc.), oil companies (such as 
Exxon Mobil Corporation, Inc.), computer companies (such as Honeywell, and IBM), 
mining companies (including Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers), and a 
variety of assorted corporations (including Holcim Ltd, EMS Chemie and Schindler 
AG). All were alleged to have actively and willingly collaborated with the apartheid 
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regime. The relief claimed by the Ntsebeza plaintiffs included restitution and 
disgorgement of all monies that could be linked to aiding, conspiring with or 
benefiting from apartheid South Africa. The plaintiffs also sought equitable relief 
including the establishment of an international historical commission and the 
institution of affirmative action and educational programmes in South Africa. They 
also asked for injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from destroying documents 
relating to their investment in apartheid South Africa. 
 On 2 August 2002, a second group, the so-called Digwamaje plaintiffs, 
brought a class action claim under ATCA as well as claims under the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 („TVPA‟)24 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organisations Act („RICO‟).25 The defendant corporations, including IBM and Xerox, 
were alleged to have provided material assistance to the apartheid regime between 
1948 and 1994, by engaging in commerce in South Africa and with the apartheid 
regime, and by employing forced labour. The TVPA claim asserted that the 
defendants had „aided and abetted the apartheid regime‟s subjecting the plaintiffs to 
torture and extrajudicial killing within the meaning of the Torture Victim Protection 
Act…under actual or apparent authority, or under color of law‟. The plaintiffs sought 
in excess of $400 billion in compensatory damages and punitive damages from all 
defendants, jointly and severally, as well as equitable and injunctive relief. 
A third group, the so-called Khulumani plaintiffs, filed a complaint in 
November 2002 against 23 corporations. Eschewing the flamboyant style of Mr Fagan 
and the extensive relief claimed by the Ntsebeza plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in the 
Khulumani lawsuit sought to distinguish their lawsuit from the Ntsebeza actions. 
Rather than bringing a class action on behalf of an extremely large class of victims, 
the Khulumani plaintiffs were 91 named individuals, together with the Khulumani 
Victim Support Group. The claims were brought in respect of specific, well-
recognised violations of international human rights law: many of the plaintiffs were 
acting as personal representatives of members of their families who had been victims 
of extrajudicial killing by the apartheid regime, while others claimed personally to 
have been victims of torture, sexual assault, indiscriminate shooting or arbitrary 
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detention by the regime. The Khulumani plaintiffs employed separate legal counsel, 
with a low key case management style. They sought compensatory and punitive 
damages and production of the defendants‟ documents related to their activities in 
South Africa, but deliberately did not seek the wider forms of relief claimed by the 
Ntsebeza plaintiffs, such as the creation of an historical commission. Moreover, 
unlike the Ntsebeza plaintiffs, the Khulumani plaintiffs did not include any South 
African companies as defendants.   
The defendant corporations in the Khulumani proceedings included banks 
(such as Barclays PLC, J. P. Morgan Chase, Dresdner Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG, 
UBS AG and Credit Suisse), oil companies (including ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, Total 
and Chevron Texaco), automotive companies (including Ford, Daimler Chrysler and 
General Motors), computer companies (IBM Corp. and Fujitsu Ltd), the armaments 
manufacturers Rheinmetall Group AG, the engineering and construction company 
Fluor Corporation, and the mining company Rio Tinto Group.  
 As the actions proceeded, the Ntsebeza and Digwamaje actions were 
consolidated and, despite the reluctance of the Khulumani plaintiffs, all the actions 
were transferred to the Southern District of New York. In July 2003, 35 of the 
defendant corporations in all the actions filed a motion to dismiss.
26
  
 To the dismay of human rights activists in South Africa, Mr Penuell Maduna, 
then Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development in the South African 
government under Thabo Mbeki, submitted an ex parte declaration to the District 
Court on 11 July 2003, setting out the South African government‟s opposition to the 
US litigation and asking for the cases to be dismissed.
27
 The late Judge Sprizzo of the 
Southern District of New York then solicited the views of the US State Dept., which 
submitted a „Statement of Interest‟ asserting that the adjudication of the cases risked 
„potentially serious adverse consequences for significant interests of the United 
States‟, that it would cause tension between the US and South Africa and that it would 
hamper the US policy of encouraging positive change through economic investment. 
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On 29 November 2004, Judge Sprizzo dismissed the plaintiffs‟ claims in their 
entirety, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under ATCA and for failing to state 
cognizable claims under the TVPA and RICO. The judgment is notable for the zeal 
with which Judge Sprizzo embraced the task of „vigilant doorkeeping‟ against the 
expansion of ATCA jurisdiction advocated by the Supreme Court in Sosa. In Judge 
Sprizzo‟s view, „it would have been unquestionably preferable for the lower federal 
courts if the Supreme Court had created a bright-line rule that limited the ATCA to 
those violations of international law clearly recognised at the time of its enactment‟ in 
1789.
28
 Citing with approval the comments of Justice Scalia in his separate concurring 
opinion in Sosa, Judge Sprizzo regretted that the consequences of the Supreme 
Court‟s decision were not only to make the task of lower federal court judges 
„immeasurably more difficult‟, but also „to invite the kind of judicial creativity that 
has caused the disparity of results and differences of opinion that preceded the 
decision in Sosa.‟29  
Strikingly, whilst Judge Sprizzo expressed concern in his Opinion for his 
fellow judges, for the governments of his own country and those of foreign states, and 
for the defendants who might become the objects of ATCA actions, he did not evince 
any concern for the victims of human rights abuses who might be deprived of an 
avenue for justice if ATCA jurisdiction were to be severely limited in the way he 
favoured. Moreover, whilst he mentioned the possibility that a policy of „constructive 
engagement‟ through investment might serve to improve the human rights records of 
foreign states, he did not mention the countervailing argument that encouraging 
accountability for human rights abuses might also serve the same end. A major 
concern appears to have been what he saw as the potential impact of ATCA cases 
against corporations on international trade: 
„In a world where many countries may fall considerably short of ideal 
economic, political and social conditions, this Court must be extremely 
cautious in permitting suits here based on a corporation‟s doing business in 
countries with less than stellar human rights records, especially since the 
consequences of such an approach could have significant, if not disastrous, 
effects on international commerce.‟30 
                                                 
28
 Sprizzo J., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, at p.547. 
29
 Ibid, p.547. 
30
 Ibid, p.554. 
Judge Sprizzo concluded that the defendants did not engage in „state action‟, 
and that neither aiding and abetting violations nor doing business in apartheid South 
Africa were sufficient as a matter of law to found an ATCA claim. In view of this 
legal finding, he did not need to consider whether the plaintiffs‟ factual allegations 
were sufficient to found a claim for aider and abettor liability; but, in a footnote, he 
opined that it seemed „unlikely that the defendants would be liable as aiders and 
abettors here‟.31 
In reaching his conclusion that aiding and abetting violations of international 
law was not itself a recognised international law violation, Judge Sprizzo found that 
neither the Nuremberg trials, nor the judgments of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, nor the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid („the Apartheid 
Convention‟) established a clearly-defined norm for ATCA purposes. He dismissed 
the judgments of the various international tribunals – including Nuremberg - as 
irrelevant because they dealt with criminal rather than civil law, and further found that 
they did not constitute binding international law. The Apartheid Convention was in 
his view „not binding international law‟, because it was not ratified by „a number of 
major world powers‟.32 He declined to follow a previous decision of his own District 
Court in the Talisman case, in which the court found that aiding and abetting liability 
was recognised under ATCA.
33
  
Judge Sprizzo noted the objections of the South African and US governments 
to the Court‟s jurisdiction. In the light of his other findings, Judge Sprizzo did not 
need to deal with these objections, but he was clearly inclined to defer to the 
executives of both countries. He noted the Supreme Court‟s reference to the apartheid 
litigation in Sosa and appears to have interpreted this „aside‟ by the Supreme Court as 
an indication that it considered that the apartheid litigation should be dismissed.
 34
   
Despite the interpretative choices he clearly made in reaching his legal 
conclusions, Judge Sprizzo resorted to the familiar argument that he had, in effect, no 
choice: „it is this court‟s job to apply the law and not some normative or moral 
ideal‟.35 The remarkable outcome of his judgment was that a set of claims alleging 
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corporate liability for some of the abuses of one of the most widely condemned 
repressive regimes of the twentieth century was struck out in its entirety at the first 
opportunity – without any expression of judicial regret or concern. 
The plaintiffs successfully appealed Judge Sprizzo‟s order of dismissal. By a 
majority, the Court of Appeals 2
nd
 Circuit held in October 2007 that the prohibition on 
aiding and abetting the commission of recognised violations of human rights was 
itself a recognised norm that provided a basis for jurisdiction under ATCA.
36
 The 
contrast between the majority and minority opinions delivered by the Appeals bench 
is a striking illustration of the different judicial viewpoints on ATCA and of the 
tensions provoked by its invocation against corporate defendants. In his dissenting 
opinion, Judge Korman declined „to join in this peculiar disposition, by which my 
colleagues desperately seek to avoid the easiest ground on which to resolve this 
appeal – that of deference to the judgment of the Republic of South Africa, supported 
by our State Department, that these cases are none of our business‟.37 He later accused 
his colleagues of contemplating a remand to the District Court „that would subject a 
foreign democratic nation to the indignity of having to defend policy judgments that 
were entrusted to it by a free people against an attack by private citizens and 
organisations who have lost the political battle at home.‟38 
The defendant corporations, supported by an amicus brief from the Bush 
administration, appealed to the Supreme Court; but, in an unusual development, the 
Court found itself unable to hear the case because of its inability to reach a quorum. 
Four of the nine justices had to recuse themselves because of their investments in or 
family connections with the defendant companies. As a result, the Supreme Court 
decided in May 2008 that the decision of the Court of Appeals must stand.  
In accordance with that Court‟s decision, the case was remitted to the District 
Court for reconsideration and the case was reassigned to Judge Shira Scheindlin. By 
the time of the hearing, the plaintiffs had attempted to maximise their prospects of 
success by dropping their claims against all but a handful of the original defendants. 
No South African defendants remained in the proceedings, but the claims against the 
Swiss and British-based banks were maintained. 
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On 8 April 2009, Judge Scheindlin delivered an Opinion allowing the case to 
proceed, but in a restricted and amended form. She applied the judgment of the 
majority in the Court of Appeals 2
nd
 Circuit that „a plaintiff may plead a theory of 
aiding and abetting under the ATCA‟, holding that the standards for such secondary 
liability must be drawn not from federal law but from customary international law, 
which requires „that an aider and abettor know that its actions will substantially assist 
the perpetrator in the commission of a crime or tort in violation of the law of 
nations.‟39  
Proceeding to a close claim-by-claim analysis of the plaintiffs‟ case, Judge 
Scheindlin struck out a number of claims and allowed others to stand. She found that 
the Ntsebeza plaintiffs had adequately pled allegations against Daimler, Ford and 
General Motors (the „automotive defendants‟) to sustain claims for aiding and 
abetting apartheid, torture, extrajudicial killing, and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, whilst the Khulumani plaintiffs had pled adequately in relation to Daimler 
but not the other two automotive companies.
40
  
In relation to the „technology defendants‟, she dismissed the Ntsebeza 
plaintiffs‟ claim that IBM aided and abetted cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, 
but found that they had adequately pled allegations that IBM had aided and abetted 
both arbitrary denationalization and apartheid. She also found that the Khulumani 
plaintiffs had adequately pled that IBM and Fujitsu „aided and abetted the commission 
of apartheid by the Government of South Africa‟, based on specific allegations that 
these companies provided „the means by which the South African Government carried 
out both racial segregation and discrimination‟ and a „strong inference that the 
technology companies knew that use of the computer hardware and software they 
supplied would inexorably support the commission of the crimes of apartheid.‟41 On 
the other hand, she contended that „not every computer system provided to the 
Government of South Africa or South African defense contractors is sufficiently tied 
to violations of customary international law‟, and dismissed the Khulumani plaintiffs‟ 
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claims that the technology defendants aided and abetted extrajudicial killing, torture, 
prolonged unlawful detention and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  
In relation to the „banking defendants‟, Judge Scheindlin dismissed both the 
Ntsebeza plaintiffs‟ and the Khulumani plaintiffs‟ rather different claims against 
Barclays Bank PLC, as well as the Khulumani plaintiffs‟ claims against UBS.  
In relation to the arms exporter Rheinmetall Group A.G., she accepted that the 
Khulumani plaintiffs had pled allegations that would be sufficient, if proved, to 
amount to aiding and abetting apartheid and extrajudicial killing. Other pleaded 
allegations were held insufficient to found liability. 
 Judge Scheindlin also considered and rejected the defendants‟ claims 
that the actions should be dismissed on the basis of the prudential doctrines of 
„comity‟ and „political question‟. In relation to the footnote on the apartheid litigation 
in the Sosa case, she commented that it merely provided guidance and did not 
mandate summary dismissal; that the views of the Executive Branch were only to be 
given serious consideration insofar as they related to a case‟s impact on foreign 
policy; and that the views of the Executive Branch, even in relation to foreign policy, 
were only one factor to be considered by the court, and were not dispositive.
42
 In 
striking contrast to Judge Sprizzo, she cited with approval the comment of the Second 
Circuit in the Kadic case, that „judges should not reflexively invoke these doctrines to 
avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human rights.‟43 
Moreover, the Executive Branch‟s views, even on foreign policy, would not prevail if 
„presented in a largely vague and speculative manner‟.44 
Judge Scheindlin displayed an equally robust approach to the arguments 
presented by the South African government. Preferring the testimony of Archbishop 
Tutu to the arguments advanced by former Minister of Justice Penuell Maduna, she 
concluded that South Africa had never instituted a policy of blanket immunity for 
corporations and that there was no inconsistency between the mandate of the TRC and 
the apartheid litigation. In fact, the goals of the TRC and the lawsuit were „closely 
aligned‟, in that both sought „to uncover the truth about past crimes and to confront 
their perpetrators‟.45 This was fatal to any argument based on international comity. 
The Defendants had chosen not to appear at the TRC, and neither they nor the South 
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African government had pointed to any forum now existing in South Africa that had, 
could or would adjudicate the Plaintiffs‟ claims; nor had the Defendants consented to 
the assertion of jurisdiction against them in South Africa. 
„Claims that a corporation that aided and abetted particular acts could be liable 
for the breadth of harms committed under apartheid have been rejected‟, Judge 
Scheindlin said in conclusion. „What survives are much narrower cases that this court 
hopes will move toward resolution after more than five years spent litigating motions 
to dismiss.‟46  
Whilst the narrowing of the ambit of these cases was probably correctly 
identified by Judge Scheindlin as the price that must be paid to enable the litigation to 
proceed in the post-Sosa era, it also had significant implications for the emergence of 
the truth referred to at the head of her Opinion. This issue will be examined in the 
next section. 
 
Courts, History and Truth 
In foregrounding the issue of truth, Judge Scheindlin entered a long-standing 
debate about the role of courts in writing the history of mass atrocities. This debate 
has centered on the role of criminal prosecutions in democratic transitions, placing 
less emphasis on the conventional concerns with deterrence and retribution and more 
emphasis on the „pedagogical purpose‟ which, some scholars have argued, must be 
kept in mind when conducting criminal trials „in the aftermath of large-scale brutality 
sponsored by an authoritarian state‟.47 Mark Osiel, in his thoughtful exploration of 
criminal trials in transitional societies, argues that in the aftermath of such brutality, 
„the need for public reckoning with the question of how such horrific events could 
have happened is more important to democratisation than the criminal law‟s more 
traditional objectives.‟48 At the same time, Osiel identifies a number of recurring 
problems that have arisen from efforts to employ criminal prosecution to influence a 
nation‟s collective memory, some of which, he argues, suggest the task‟s 
impossibility, while others suggest its undesirability. One of the recurring problems 
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highlighted by Osiel is that criminal prosecutions „can unwittingly distort historical 
understanding of the nation‟s recent past‟.49  
Concerns about the distortion of historical understanding by criminal trials 
have not only been made of domestic trials. Lawrence Douglas has cogently criticised 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for its failure fully to do justice to 
traumatic history. He observed: 
„Central aspects of the Nuremberg case – the charter‟s restricted view of 6(c), 
the attempt to use the conspiracy charge to reach pre-war atrocities, and the 
prosecution‟s own uncertain parsing of the meaning and normative foundation 
of the concept of crimes against humanity – all compromised the trial‟s effort 
to do justice to the history of the Holocaust. At times, the legal lens through 
which evidence of atrocity was filtered resulted in substantial distortions of the 
historical record. More often, the legal structure fashioned at Nuremberg failed 
in a more complex fashion to represent and make sense of traumatic history.‟50 
Lawrence concedes that not all evidence of the extermination of the Jews was 
misrepresented at Nuremberg, adding that, to their credit, „the prosecution and the 
court both struggled to present a detailed account of the Nazis‟ campaign of 
Judeocide…‟51 Yet, he argued, „in spite of the prosecution‟s redoubtable efforts to 
document the Nazis‟ campaign to exterminate the Jews of Europe, these pedagogic 
efforts were importantly compromised by the legal grid in which unprecedented 
atrocities were framed, contributing to the serious shortcomings in the historical 
understanding of the Holocaust that emerged from Nuremberg.‟52 Moreover, since 
„the experiences of Holocaust survivors found restricted expression in the testimony 
of courtroom proxies‟, such as non-Jewish political prisoners at Auschwitz, „even 
when the trial offered a reasonably reliable historical picture…it marginalised the 
experiences of victims of traumatic history.‟53 
Commenting on the treatment of victims at the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, Julie Mertus argued that, while survivors have the greatest 
need for a record, „the kind of record most survivors need to put the past at rest is one 
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that a tribunal cannot provide.‟54 Their need for participation leading to healing is not, 
in her view, well-served by a court record which „merely presses the words of 
survivors into the language of law.‟55 
Some scholars have argued that it is positively undesirable for criminal courts 
to concern themselves with the writing of history. Hannah Arendt, after observing the 
criminal trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem, was moved to write that „the purpose of a 
trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even the noblest of ulterior purposes – “the 
making of a record of the Hitler regime which would withstand the test of history”… - 
can only detract from the law‟s main business: to weigh the charges brought against 
the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due punishment.‟56 Whilst her 
statement about the purpose of a criminal trial is expressed in general terms, it may 
perhaps more accurately be seen as a response to the particular way in which the 
Eichmann prosecution was conducted in Israel, which she called „bad history and 
cheap rhetoric‟.57 The prosecution‟s attempts to put the history of anti-Semitism itself 
centre stage and to use the trial for Israeli nation-building resulted, in her view, in the 
sacrifice of justice and due process for the accused. In similar vein to Arendt, Ian 
Buruma has argued that „when the court of law is used for history lessons, then the 
risk of show trials cannot be far off.‟58 
Lawrence Douglas agrees that „the primary responsibility of a criminal trial is 
to resolve questions of guilt in a procedurally fair manner‟ and that „one must 
appreciate the potential tension between the core interests of justice and the concerns 
of didactic legality‟.59 But, he contends, Arendt‟s insistence „that the sole purpose of a 
trial is to render justice and nothing else, presents… a crabbed and needlessly 
restrictive vision of the trial as legal form‟.60 He endorses Judith Shklar‟s view that 
the ends of justice and pedagogy can be entirely compatible. All trials must, to a 
degree, resolve contested history – did the accused commit the acts, why, how? 
Whilst the „conventions of proof that guide the historian and the judge differ 
importantly‟, in Douglas‟ view, „these disparities do not prevent the law from playing 
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a valuable role in clarifying the historical record.‟61 He points out that, at Nuremberg, 
„it was not the pursuit of didactic history that ultimately eroded the legal integrity of 
the proceeding conventionally conceived; rather, it was the strenuous efforts to secure 
formal legal integrity that often led to a failure fully to do justice to traumatic 
history.‟62 He does not, however, conclude from this that the criminal trial should be 
shunned as a tool for responding to traumatic history. 
Richard Wilson‟s 2005 article on the work of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia notes Arendt‟s view that courts should not 
assume the responsibility of writing history and contrasts it with the view, associated 
particularly with the Critical Legal Studies Movement, that „the law, even if it tries, 
cannot produce a comprehensive historical account of a period‟.63 „Like it or not‟, 
Wilson argues, „there has been a global trend for ensuring greater accountability for 
mass crimes, and national and international courts and commissions are increasingly 
the places of choice for victims, perpetrators and bystanders to tell their stories about 
past atrocities.‟64 He suggests that the problems associated with courts and the writing 
of history are less pressing in the case of international tribunals, which are free from 
the pressures national courts experience in transitional or post-conflict societies. As a 
result of its autonomy from nation-states, Wilson argues, „the ICTY has resisted being 
drawn into constructing facile collective representations (the suffering of all Bosnian 
Muslims, the guilt of all Serbs, etc.) necessary for nationalist mythology.‟65 Unlike the 
Israeli and French courts in the Holocaust trials, the international criminal tribunals 
established by the UN are „separated from the wider project of nation building in the 
aftermath of authoritarianism.‟66 As a result, in his view, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has left a „qualitatively distinctive historical 
record of the origins and contours of mass atrocity‟ and, he contends, international 
tribunals such as the ICTY are „altering the relationship between law and history‟.67  
Whilst the debate continues about both the proper purposes of criminal trials 
and the ability of criminal courts to write „good history‟, no similar literature yet 
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exists in relation to civil proceedings. The apartheid litigation, if it proceeds to trial, 
will provide an interesting case study of the willingness and capacity of civil courts to 
contribute to clarifying the historical record. It will also provide an opportunity to 
explore the strengths and weaknesses of foreign as opposed to domestic courts in this 
endeavour.  
It is already clear from the apartheid litigation that different US judges 
involved in the case to date have embraced differing conceptions of their role. On the 
basis of the Sprizzo and Scheindlin Opinions, it is clear that Judge Scheindlin is open 
to a more expansive conception of her task than her colleague, and her decision to 
place Desmond Tutu‟s comment at the head of her Opinion suggests that she is more 
sensitive and receptive to the wider implications of judging cases of this nature.  
It is also evident that some of the issues which have arisen in the context of 
criminal trials will also arise, mutatis mutandis, in relation to civil proceedings. Some 
of Lawrence Douglas‟ observations in relation to the Nuremberg trial have already 
found an echo in the apartheid litigation. The legal structure of ATCA jurisprudence – 
the „legal grid‟ to which Douglas alluded - suggests that any truth which emerges 
from the apartheid litigation can only be a partial or diminished truth. The need 
(recognised both by the plaintiffs and, it seems, by Judge Scheindlin) to „narrow‟ the 
number of claims and defendants in order to ensure that the litigation was able to 
proceed at all in the post-Sosa era has also narrowed the prospects for producing a 
nuanced version of history that historians of apartheid – and, perhaps more 
importantly, the South African public - would recognise.  
Thus, for example, the current absence from the proceedings of any South 
African companies, such as Anglo-American Corporation and De Beers (originally 
defendants in the Ntsebeza action), means that the role of South African business in 
relation to apartheid will not be explored. Omitting them was probably perceived by 
the plaintiffs to have strategic value in terms of the ATCA, reducing the prospect of 
successful objections to jurisdiction on the basis of prudential doctrines or forum non 
conveniens. Yet South African mining companies were closely involved in the 
development of discriminatory legislation and practices, before and during apartheid, 
and enjoyed an intimate relationship with the apartheid regime. Any attempt to 
uncover „the truth‟ about the causes and effects of apartheid which leaves them out of 
account will inevitably be unsatisfactory. Similarly, Judge Scheindlin‟s dismissal of 
the claims against the banking defendants means that those who bankrolled apartheid 
will also be conspicuous by their absence. Whilst this may make some sense in 
narrow legal terms, and may also have strategic value in the difficult political climate 
in which the ATCA currently operates, it is nonsensical from the point of view of 
exposing the truth and confronting perpetrators.  
In addition, the attempt to bring the plaintiffs‟ claims squarely within post-
Sosa ATCA jurisprudence means that they have become increasingly focused on the 
obvious physical manifestations of the brutality of apartheid – killings, torture, etc. – 
rather than on the inherent, structural violence of the system, so corrosive in all its 
aspects of human dignity and wellbeing. Judge Scheindlin rejected claims „that a 
corporation that aided and abetted particular acts could be liable for the breadth of 
harms committed under apartheid‟; but, in her delicate balancing act, she also arrived 
at the historically baffling conclusion that some of the defendant companies aided and 
abetted apartheid but were not thereby responsible for torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. The plaintiffs, it seems, must prove detailed causal links between 
the defendants‟ actions and the tip of the iceberg of apartheid violence. As at 
Nuremberg, the „legal grid‟ referred to by Douglas has already compromised efforts 
to represent and make sense of traumatic history.  
Writing of the 1994 French prosecution of Nazi collaborator Paul Touvier, 
Mark Osiel notes that the law‟s need for an offence with which the accused could still 
be charged after so many years resulted in an overemphasis in the eyes of many 
Frenchmen on Touvier‟s action in ordering the death of seven Jewish hostages. 
Moreover, in seeming to challenge the importance of the French Resistance, the legal 
proceedings became „highly unlikely to find a sympathetic national audience‟.68 Osiel 
concludes that „when collective memory has already become comfortably entrenched, 
the law‟s efforts to excavate and scrutinise it are only likely to discredit the law and 
its professional spokesmen.‟69  
If this result is to be avoided in the apartheid litigation, the US courts will need 
to be sensitive to memories and beliefs already „comfortably entrenched‟ in the minds 
of many South Africans. One such entrenched belief is that apartheid was a crime 
against humanity. In contrast, Judge Sprizzo in his Opinion seemed at pains to find 
that apartheid was neither a crime against humanity – because not enough „major 
powers‟ had ratified the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
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of Apartheid - nor in any other way a breach of any fundamental principles of 
international law. Judge Scheindlin too dismissed the Apartheid Convention because 
it had not been ratified by Western European and North American countries, and 
because „a substantial proportion of the nations that have ratified the Apartheid 
Convention have poor human rights records‟.70  She declared state-sponsored 
apartheid „indisputably a tort under customary international law‟; but she concluded 
that the international legal system had not thus far „definitively established liability 
for non-state actors who follow or even further state-sponsored racial oppression‟.71 
These distinctions, familiar enough to lawyers, may unfortunately only serve to 
discredit the law in the eyes of those who have survived such oppression. 
Another memory, entrenched (if not „comfortably‟) in the minds of black 
South Africans, is of the undignified ways in which they were treated by their 
employers in the apartheid era.  Moreover, although there may be no opinion poll 
evidence to prove it, most South Africans probably believe that business was 
complicit in the design and implementation of apartheid and that it benefited 
financially from the exploitation of black workers. Of course, no court can be 
compelled to make legal findings in line with public opinion; but where courts are 
perceived as writing history, as courts in these cases surely must, they would be wise 
to explain and justify most carefully any conclusions that are at odds with popular 
conceptions of the past, if the law is not to be discredited, as Osiel warns. 
Linked to this is the issue of the meaning attributed to success or failure in 
litigation. As the apartheid litigation has already shown, plaintiffs‟ civil claims under 
ATCA may be dismissed, in whole or in part, even before the case reaches trial. When 
this happens, either at or before trial, what impact does this have on the historical 
record? In relation to criminal trials, as Osiel noted, the media plays a role in 
conveying messages about what the court‟s decision signifies. For example, when the 
prosecution fails to discharge the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 
the accused may be misleadingly presented by the media as „innocent‟ or „cleared‟. In 
the apartheid litigation, the case against the banking defendants was dismissed for the 
technical legal reason that „merely‟ providing funds to a repressive regime was not 
enough, in the court‟s view, to found liability under ATCA. While this does not, of 
course, mean that international banks had no responsibility for apartheid, the court‟s 
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decision may all too easily be portrayed in this light, and the public may be left 
bemused by the idea that computer companies and vehicle manufacturers were „more 
responsible‟ for apartheid and its attendant evils than the banks.  
It is not only the court or the media that may do violence to history. The 
Sprizzo Opinion contains an example of the distortions sometimes introduced by 
lawyers in the hope of bolstering their clients‟ prospects of success. The lawyers for 
the defendant corporations apparently contended that apartheid had ended in 1990 – 
this despite the fact that violence raged in South Africa after that time, that the 
negotiations for a new (interim) constitution were only concluded at the end of 1993, 
and that the first democratic elections did not take place until April 1994!
72
 
None of the court decisions rendered so far in the apartheid litigation has 
succeeded in conveying a real flavour of the apartheid era. A young person innocent 
of the events and debates of that time would be only slightly better informed for 
having read the Opinions handed down to date. In the Sprizzo Opinon, apartheid and 
the activities of the corporate defendants became simply the short „background‟ 
section for an extensive legal discussion. The picture briefly sketched by Judge 
Sprizzo was of foreign corporations which simply passively benefited from apartheid 
policies which provided them with cheap labour, cheap power and high levels of 
government services to white areas. This account of the defendants‟ passive or 
reluctant acceptance of apartheid contrasts with some of the vivid contemporaneous 
newspaper reports of the time. The Los Angeles Times, for example, reported in 1986 
that Revd. Leon Sullivan, a GM board member, was „concerned‟ that GM (a 
defendant in the apartheid litigation) „had used police guard dogs and whips to 
suppress a strike at a GM plant in South Africa‟.73  
In the Court of Appeals, two of the judges omitted any discussion of the 
factual background to the case or the nature of apartheid. The third judge, 
commenting on this omission, set out his view of the facts of the case, but apparently 
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with the principal aim simply of demonstrating the hopelessness of the plaintiffs‟ 
cause. In Judge Scheindlin‟s Opinion, the factual background to the case, though 
more sympathetically expressed, occupies only a couple of paragraphs.
74
 Lawyers and 
judges are socialised through their legal training in to understanding and practising the 
technique of transforming traumatic events in to the meat of dry legal debate; and, 
especially in ground-breaking cases, most lawyers would probably view the 
foregrounding of legal argument as inevitable. Yet, to some extent at least, this 
professional tendency sits uneasily alongside the importance of the emergence of 
„truth‟ identified by Judge Scheindlin. It is fair to note, however, that if the case 
ultimately proceeds to trial, a more extensive treatment of the facts may be expected.  
 One grey area at present is the extent to which discovery of documents in the 
apartheid litigation may produce new or revealing information about the defendant 
corporations‟ involvement with the apartheid regime and its activities. Whilst 
discovery can often be crucial, it remains to be seen how much relevant 
documentation has survived to the present day, as the defendants may quite 
legitimately have disposed of old documents from the apartheid era. In contrast with 
the Nuremberg trial, at which the Allies were famously able to „hang‟ the accused by 
reference to Nazi documentation, or with civil proceedings dealing with more recent 
events (such as the Trafigura litigation in the High Court in London, in which 
documentary evidence from the defendants‟ own files appears to have been a factor in 
prompting a pre-trial settlement in September 2009), civil proceedings dealing with 
more distant events may be relatively limited in their ability to uncover the past or 
clarify the historical record. The apartheid litigation, if it proceeds, will be a 
fascinating test. 
 
Conclusion 
As discussed above, the apartheid litigation has obliged the US courts to consider 
objections to jurisdiction from the democratically elected government of South Africa 
based on the policies the „new‟ South Africa has adopted and the institutions it has 
created – especially the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission – in its 
attempt to navigate the difficult waters of accountability for past abuses and the 
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construction of a more prosperous future. Despite earlier judicial indications that the 
US courts should defer to the views of the US and South African governments in 
these circumstances, Judge Scheindlin in her recent Opinion declined to do so. Her 
decision implies that US courts will not automatically defer to the new democratic 
governments of transitional societies, even in the sensitive and difficult circumstances 
of political transition.  
The ANC had itself, in its submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, emphasised the need for the corporate sector to acknowledge its 
complicity with the apartheid regime and to make reparation. Whilst it was clear from 
the terms of the transition that the ANC hoped to keep litigation about accountability 
for the apartheid past to a minimum within South Africa itself, the concern to protect 
the stability of a fledgling democracy which might have made protracted domestic 
litigation undesirable – especially criminal proceedings against the security forces - 
did not obviously apply to civil litigation instituted in foreign courts against foreign 
companies.  
Despite the arguments later made by the South African government, the 
mandate of the TRC clearly could not and did not preclude the bringing of criminal or 
civil suits, except in the very limited number of cases in which amnesty was granted 
on individual application. No corporations applied for amnesty, and they were 
probably ineligible for it.
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 Had they applied, they would, importantly, have had to 
acknowledge the commission of a legally wrongful act – either delictual or criminal - 
and to make full disclosure of their actions.
76
  
Even if foreign or multinational corporations had successfully applied to the 
TRC for amnesty, amnesties granted in South Africa could not legally have precluded 
an ATCA claim in the US, though it might have made the opposition of the South 
African government to the hearing of such a claim more understandable. 
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 The South African Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) s.332 provides for the prosecution of 
companies. Where mens rea is a requirement for an offence, the criminal intent of the director or 
servant is attributed to the company. Only fines (including asset forfeiture) may be imposed on a 
company. In terms of civil liability, corporate employers can be held vicariously liable for a civil 
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The ANC, in its submission to the TRC „institutional hearing‟ on business and 
labour in 1997, recognised that business was not a monolith. It conceded that „not all 
of the measures of apartheid were sought by business‟ and acknowledged that „as the 
apartheid system became increasingly dysfunctional to business from the mid-1980s 
onwards, a number of historically privileged business organisations…began to 
grapple for solutions that reached beyond the parameters apartheid political leaders 
were then prepared to contemplate.‟ It also recognised that the role played by a 
number of leading business personalities and organisations in promoting dialogue and 
negotiation at the end of 1980s was „a positive contribution to bringing about a 
transition to democracy in our country‟. This could not, however, in the ANC‟s view, 
„detract from the reality of a record of extensive collaboration by business with a 
system involved in gross violations of human rights.‟ It concluded its submission with 
a plea to business to confront its past, to acknowledge its role in past injustices, and to 
recognise that genuine reconciliation required action to address „the inequalities, 
inequities and developmental backlogs that the system of discrimination, from which 
[historically privileged business] benefited in varying degrees‟ had left as the heritage 
of the new democratic order. Most corporations did not respond to the invitation to 
attend the TRC hearing.
77
  
Commenting on the testimony presented to the TRC on the role of business 
under apartheid, Merle Lipton notes the conflicting views put forward. Some of those 
testifying argued that events since 1990 confirmed the argument that business had 
contributed to „the erosion of apartheid and the conversion of the ruling elite to the 
view that a negotiated ending to apartheid was desirable and possible‟.78 Others, 
however, „denied that the historical record gave support to this view and reiterated the 
argument…that business was the major supporter and beneficiary of apartheid, only 
switching its support at the last moment when the demise of apartheid became 
unstoppable.‟79  
As Lipton points out, in the apartheid era, the debate about the role of business 
under apartheid was „closely linked to questions of political strategy, such as whether 
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the international community should impose economic sanctions on SA.‟80 It was 
therefore not surprising that these debates were highly charged and polarised before 
1990. More surprising, in Lipton‟s view, was „the continued acrimony over these 
issues in post-apartheid South Africa, and the persistence of the negative view of the 
role of business…‟81 The explanation, as she correctly observes, is that there are: 
„close links between perceptions of the historical issues and current political 
issues, such as whether business should pay reparations to the victims of 
apartheid and whether South Africa should adopt an affirmative action or 
black empowerment policy. The past is constantly invoked in relation to 
claims/entitlements on the one hand and responsibilities on the other hand. 
Thus, the history matters and is perceived by all parties as relevant.‟82 
As Lipton notes, some fear that any credit given to „white‟ business would be used by 
corporations as an excuse to avoid contributing to reparations, to oppose social reform 
and redistribution, and to decline to take a political backseat in post-apartheid South 
Africa – an understandable concern in a country facing acute problems of poverty and 
inequality. While the sensitivity of the issue might lead some to conclude that digging 
up the past is unwise, Lipton contends that „a fuller understanding of the messy, 
complex truth about the role of business under apartheid holds out the hope of 
improved relationships in post-apartheid SA.‟83 She believes that fuller understanding 
has the potential „to provide a more realistic basis for building a common society than 
simplistic models of a society composed of demons and saints.‟84  
 Lipton perceptively highlights the relevance of history to present-day politics 
in a society with „an appalling inheritance that needs to be righted‟. 85 This 
connectedness between past and present – and the massively important present-day 
consequences of re-interpreting the past – suggest that any court venturing into this 
terrain should do so carefully. The danger is obviously that a foreign court may be 
less sensitive than a domestic court to the significance and implications of its work.   
Yet if it proceeds thoughtfully, as Judge Scheindlin promises to do, there seems no 
reason in principle why a foreign court should not cope adequately with these 
admittedly sensitive issues. Moreover, a foreign judge may have the advantage that 
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(s)he is not a member of a domestic judiciary carrying the baggage of its role in the 
repressive past, and that his/her views were not indelibly formed in the crucible of 
political struggle.  
 If courts in fledgling democracies are able and willing to deal effectively with 
class actions from the poor, the marginalised, or those seeking politically 
inconvenient truths about the past, there is, of course, no reason for the US courts to 
usurp that function. Given the difficulties of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction, most 
victims of human rights abuses would prefer to litigate at home, if – reluctantly - they 
must litigate at all. The fact that the apartheid litigation has still not reached the trial 
stage after nearly seven years proves that ATCA litigation against corporations is no 
easy road for plaintiffs.  Yet, in transitional societies, the legal system is often  
experiencing a crisis of legitimacy – as has been the case in post-apartheid South 
Africa, with the exception of the new Constitutional Court - and may be ill-equipped 
to handle politically-sensitive litigation. In some transitional societies, the local legal 
profession may have been decimated by violence, as in Rwanda, may have left the 
country (as in East Timor), or may be tainted by association. Where local lawyers 
exist, they may feel at a professional disadvantage in relation to the highly-paid 
advisers of multinational corporations, and may not be permitted (or be able to afford) 
to accept clients on a contingency fee basis. The local legal system may not permit or 
be able to handle class actions.  
In transitional justice literature, international criminal tribunals have been 
much criticised for being inadequately „rooted‟ in local culture and excessively distant 
from their „audience‟ in the traumatised society with which they are concerned. These 
tribunals were, of course, a valiant attempt to respond to the inadequacies of local 
criminal justice systems in the aftermath of repression and the pressures on new 
democratic governments. Nevertheless, the criticisms have prompted attempts to 
create „hybrid‟ tribunals, situated in the new democracy, staffed by both 
„internationals‟ and „locals‟, and applying a combination of international and 
municipal law. There is, at present, no equivalent to these „hybrid‟ criminal tribunals 
in relation to civil claims against non-state actors: victims/survivors must turn to 
municipal courts, at home or abroad.  
Whilst there may be good reasons in terms of the rule of law to encourage the 
legal systems of new democracies to take on the challenge of dealing with their 
countries‟ pasts, it will not serve the victims and citizens of those countries well if a 
pretence of respect for the sovereignty of a new democracy is used to mask the 
inclinations of US conservatives to protect the interests of multinational corporations. 
The governments of countries emerging from long periods of conflict or repression 
often have good reason to be concerned about poverty and unemployment. Rightly or 
wrongly, they may well see foreign direct investment as vital to a more prosperous 
future, which in turn makes them fearful of antagonising the corporate sector. By 
providing an avenue for accountability and redress outside the jurisdiction of the new 
democracy, US courts can allow anxious governments to distance themselves 
strategically from litigation against corporations and thus help to quell their fears of 
corporate „reprisals‟. Equally, where the governments of new democracies are 
motivated by less honourable concerns, rule of law arguments probably do not 
support „repatriating‟ the litigation.  
Human rights activists hope that ATCA litigation can be instrumental in 
persuading the corporate sector not to give succour to regimes that systematically 
commit serious human rights abuses. At the very least, the apartheid litigation may 
encourage corporations to cooperate after the event with domestic mechanisms, such 
as national truth and reconciliation commissions, which provide opportunities for 
acknowledgment of responsibility for past actions and a forum in which redress can 
be discussed. Simply ignoring the victims of ousted repressive regimes has become, 
as a result of the plaintiffs‟ persistence and Judge Scheindlin‟s Opinion, a more 
troublesome and dangerous option. The judgment of the US Court of Appeals 
(Second Circuit) in the Talisman case in October 2009 poses new difficulties for the 
plaintiffs in the apartheid litigation; yet, whatever the ultimate outcome of the 
apartheid litigation, there can be little doubt that such litigation strengthens the 
prospect that, at least in the longer term, corporations will be more stringently called 
to account for their conduct.
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The message of the apartheid litigation for the governments of new 
democracies must surely be to respond to the needs of victims in a timely and 
respectful manner, if such litigation is to be averted. The South African government 
created a truth and reconciliation commission with a mandate to recommend 
reparations for the victims it identified through its work. For reasons which will 
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probably never be entirely clear, the government continually delayed responding to 
the TRC‟s recommendations and regularly intimated that it would not endorse them. 
It also refused to consider the needs of those who would have been eligible to be 
declared victims by the TRC but who, for a variety of reasons including their difficult 
circumstances, learned of the existence of the TRC too late to make a claim. Whilst 
taking a tough line on reparations for victims, the government has appeared at times 
to be sympathetic to the demands of the security forces for a new amnesty deal. When 
some of the victims of apartheid ultimately turned to the US courts for redress from 
multinational corporations, it was a last resort. The apartheid litigation was eminently 
avoidable. Whilst the South African government may have been piqued by the move 
and concerned about the implications for its reputation abroad, for foreign investment 
and for jobs, it should have recognised that its own conduct had contributed to the 
initiation of the litigation, and that opposing it was inappropriate.  
Interestingly, after renewed lobbying by Archbishop Tutu, Khulumani and 
others on behalf of the plaintiffs, the new South African government under Jacob 
Zuma has withdrawn its opposition to the litigation.
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 The previous government‟s 
objections, like its policy on HIV/Aids, will probably come to be remembered as 
another quirk of the Mbeki era. The claims of victims should not – as Judge 
Scheindlin appears to have appreciated - be subject to such political vagaries. 
Whilst US courts may often be the last hope of redress for the victims of 
abusive pasts, it remains to be seen whether they will prove able to write „good 
history‟. As discussed above, the various ways in which plaintiffs must „tailor‟ ATCA 
claims and the difficulties faced by progressive courts in the post-Sosa era are limiting 
factors.  As discussed above, national and international criminal courts and tribunals 
dealing with responsibility for past abuses have also encountered difficulties caused 
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by the „legal grid‟ within which they operate. Truth and reconciliation commissions, 
including the South African TRC, have also faced criticism for the partial nature of 
the truth they have exposed.
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 The trajectory of the apartheid litigation to date raises 
concerns that the truth revealed by the US civil courts may be a diminished truth: one 
that exonerates some corporations unjustifiably, focuses unduly on the activities of the 
few, excludes consideration of the role of South African business, and concentrates 
excessively on the brutal, physical manifestations of the violence of the apartheid 
regime.  
At the time of writing, Judge Scheindlin‟s Opinion was under appeal. 
Ultimately, the apartheid litigation, like other ATCA cases against corporations, may 
be settled out of court. This possibility further highlights the contingent nature of the 
ability of courts – including the US courts - to contribute to clarifying responsibility 
for past abuses. Judge Scheindlin‟s recognition of the importance of this difficult task 
for transitional societies and her commendable willingness to attempt it open up new 
territory in transitional justice. The apartheid litigation, for all its shortcomings to 
date, has already served to stimulate debate in South Africa. The prospects for a US 
„jurisprudence of truth‟ are in the balance. 
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